Please answer these questions before continuing to the survey questions.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, is the United Nations-affiliated organisation responsible for applying nuclear safeguards and verifying whether nuclear material remains in peaceful activities.

Its reports do not determine every political or legal question. However, they are the principal source of internationally verified information concerning Iran’s nuclear material, declared facilities and safeguards obligations.

Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Under the treaty:

- Iran has an inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided this is consistent with its non-proliferation obligations.
- Iran is prohibited from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- Iran must maintain a safeguards agreement allowing the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful activities to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the Additional Protocol and the 2015 JCPOA are separate arrangements.

The Additional Protocol provides the IAEA with expanded information and access beyond a standard safeguards agreement. Iran signed but did not ratify it. Iran applied it provisionally under the JCPOA before ending that implementation in February 2021.

Iran began reducing its JCPOA commitments in May 2019 and stopped implementing its remaining JCPOA nuclear-related commitments, including provisional application of the Additional Protocol, on 23 February 2021. This did not terminate Iran’s underlying Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which entered into force in 1974 and remains applicable.

In May 2025, the IAEA issued a comprehensive assessment of several unresolved safeguards issues.

The IAEA concluded that Iran had not declared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three undeclared locations: Lavisan-Shian, Varamin and Turquzabad.

It assessed that these locations were associated with an undeclared structured nuclear program conducted until the early 2000s and that some activities involved undeclared nuclear material.

Because Iran had not provided technically credible explanations, the IAEA said it could not determine whether the material had been consumed, mixed with declared material or remained outside safeguards.

On 12 June 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran’s failures since 2019 to provide full and timely cooperation concerning undeclared nuclear material and activities constituted non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.

These findings concern safeguards compliance and unresolved nuclear material. They do not, by themselves, establish that Iran had made a current decision to construct a nuclear weapon.

Uranium used for most civilian nuclear power is commonly enriched to approximately 3–5% uranium-235. Iran also produced uranium enriched to 20% and 60%.

Uranium enriched to 60% is well above levels normally required for civilian power generation and is technically much closer to weapons-grade uranium, commonly associated with enrichment around 90%.

Before the military attacks beginning in June 2025, the IAEA estimated that Iran had accumulated 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60%. The IAEA had verified 432.9 kilograms of this material.

Iran was the only non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT known to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched to this level.

In this section, please select to what degree you agree or disagree with the following statements.

Iran maintains that:

- Its nuclear program is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes.
- It has a right under the NPT to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
- It has not decided to construct a nuclear weapon.
- Restrictions and sanctions have applied standards to Iran that are not applied consistently to every other state.
- Military attacks on its nuclear facilities were unlawful and created security conditions that obstructed normal inspections.
- Its cooperation with the IAEA should be considered in the context of those attacks and continuing military threats.

Supporters of Iran’s position also argue that enrichment level alone does not prove weaponisation and that states may develop advanced nuclear capability for deterrence, bargaining power or civilian purposes without deciding to build a weapon.

Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.

The legality of military action and whether a respondent considers it morally or strategically justified are separate questions. This survey asks for your policy judgement rather than a definitive legal conclusion.